ABSTRACT The counterfeit and stolen information and communication technologies (ICT) devices are an essential and growing problem. Reliable technology for the identification of ICT devices is required to enable blocking of these devices in the network worldwide. Motivated by this challenge, we elaborate on the idea of using the unique degradation image of flash memory chip (DFMC) as the identifier of the device. This idea is based on the assumption that the distribution of degraded segments in the memory chip is unique enough to provide reliable identification of the device. In this paper, we provide a proof of concept through a hardware experiment. For this experiment, we developed a custom test bed and special software enabling the forced degradation of NOR-flash memory chips. We, then, consider the uniqueness of such identifiers using combination theory and consider practical issues of DFMC implementation, including the initial identification procedure, light dynamic identifiers, and identification using a cross-correlation function and options of dynamic identification. We conclude that using DFMC addresses relevant challenges of ICT devices identification.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent development of electronics has led to active penetration of information and communication technologies (ICT) to all spheres of life (e.g., automatization of industrial processes, e-health, smart homes, smart wearables) [1] - [5] . In the beginning, ICT devices mostly had an entertainment purpose. Now there are many mission-critical applications, such as e-health [6] or remote surgery [7] . These applications need more rigid requirements for reliability, security, and quality of services [6] , [8] . To satisfy these higher requirements, manufacturers made significant efforts to improve their devices [9] . Consequently, these devices tend to be more expensive and often become a target of counterfeiting.
The counterfeiting of ICT devices is a significant and growing problem according to recent report of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) [10] . The report shows that investments in the economy, employment, right holders and users are suffering economically from counterfeiting. Moreover, counterfeit devices cause severe health
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International standardization bodies consider combating counterfeits as a crucial technological challenge for modern society. For example, combating counterfeit and stolen ICT equipment was the aim of Q15/11 ITU-T. Current efforts are focused on developing solutions to block (or deny ICT services) any stolen or counterfeit ICT devices worldwide. Reliable technology for the identification of ICT devices is required to enable these solutions.
Existing identification solutions can be classified into two subordinate groups: virtual identifiers and physical identifiers. The implementation of physical methods is limited by the local network since these require direct contact. The virtual methods are easily scalable, thus can be employed for any size networks. However, during the ITU workshop ''Global approaches on combating counterfeiting and stolen ICT devices'' held on 23 July 2018 in Geneva 1 it was noted that virtual identifiers (e.g. IMEI and other identifiers recorded in erasable memory) are not robust enough to prevent tampering.
In this paper, we elaborate on the recently presented approach of using a degraded segment in flash memory chips as an identifier of the device [11] . The idea is based on the assumption that the distribution of degraded segments in the memory chip is unique enough to provide reliable identification of the device [11] - [13] . The main objectives of this paper are: (i) to provide a proof of concept through hardware experiments, (ii) to define approaches of using the degraded flash memory as an identifier of ICT devices and (iii) to define essential challenges for future work.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we provide an overview of the identification systems. In Section III we describe the proposed method. In Section IV, we provide results of the hardware testing of the proposed method and study the repeatability of the identifiers. We consider use case scenario of the method and some implementation issues in Section V. In Section VI we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Identification of the ICT devices is an essential enabler for the management of network and services. There are myriad of technologies developed for the identification. These technologies can be classified into two groups: virtual identifiers and physical identifiers. In order to set the niche for the proposed approach, we first provide an overview of notable identification systems.
A. VIRTUAL IDENTIFIERS
The virtual methods can be roughly classified to softwarebased fingerprinting and virtual identifiers which are recorded in devices. The software-based fingerprinting methods rely on differences in the software configuration of an ICT device. Internet companies widely utilize such a method for tracking users and targeted advertising. The softwarebased fingerprint consists of a number of parameters such as IP address, operating system version, device location and time settings, battery status, screen resolution, touch support, language setup, etc. Utilizing all of these parameters together creates a unique identifier for an ICT device. The more parameters used in the software-based fingerprinting, the more unique the identifier. Thus, in the case of a simple device, such as IoT sensor device, the software-based fingerprint will consist of only a few parameters and the identifier will be weak. Therefore, implementation of the softwarebased fingerprinting is limited to relatively powerful devices such as smartphones, laptops or tablet PCs.
The virtual identifiers which are recorded in devices are applicable for network identification of major types of the devices, including simple IoT devices. Currently, the virtual identifiers are recorded into the memory of the ICT device during the manufacturing process [14] , [15] . For example, Ethernet MAC-address or International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). The latter is the most widespread identifier type for mobile ICT devices. However, these identifier are vulnerable to cloning and tampering [16] - [19] .
In [20] , and [21] approaches are discussed for the detection of devices with the same MAC address, utilizing analysis of frame sequence. However, these approaches can be implemented only in a local area and are not applicable for the identification of the devices beyond a local network. Moreover, since all of the approaches are software-based, they can be hacked by using a different system configuration or communication behavior.
B. PHYSICAL IDENTIFIERS
Alternatively to virtual methods, the physical methods utilize the individuality of ICT device hardware. Notable examples of the physical methods are: integrated clock skew estimation, radio-frequency fingerprinting, and utilizing degradation uniqueness of the flash memory.
An identification method based on the integrated clock skew was proposed by Kohno et al. [22] . The method employs TCP and ICMP time stamps, thus, the identification can be tampered by means of software (e.g., TCP and ICMP time stamps used by the method could be altered or disabled) [23] .
The radio-frequency fingerprinting came from the military sphere, where transmitter individuality has been used to distinguish between friendly and enemy radars since the Vietnam War era [23] . Later, similar systems were implemented in mobile networks to prevent access from unauthorized phones [24] . Further, K. Remley et al. experimentally showed differences between signals of different 802.11 transmitters [25] . The experiments proved that RF fingerprinting methods could be used to identified features of various interfaces in an anechoic chamber. However, in a practical case, the fingerprints can be altered by environmental effects, such as interference with other nodes. Moreover, a considerable part of ICT devices connect to the operator network utilizing intermediate nodes (e.g., gateways, relays in mesh networks), while the RF fingerprinting methods require a direct connection to a trustable authority (e.g. service provider). Thus, the RF fingerprinting is suitable for only highly specific purposes while the IoT era requires mass methods.
C. THE IDENTIFICATION OF ICT DEVICE USING UNIQUE PROPERTIES OF FLASH MEMORY CHIPS
The concept of physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and their implementation using integrated circuits introduced in [26] provides a theoretical foundation for the authentication device using individual properties of flash memory chips. The theory was developed further in [12] and [13] , where authors proposed to utilize variations in threshold voltages as a unique property of a NAND flash memory chip. The proposed approach was considered as an enabler for several application scenarios: the random number generator, generator of cryptographic key and device fingerprinting. However, the voltage variations may significantly change in time due to the degradation of the chip. Thus the proposed approach can be efficient only for short-term use.
Alternative PUF-based method relies on degraded blocks of memory which appeared randomly due to microscopic manufacturing defects in a NAND memory chip [27] . A pattern of the degraded memory cells was suggested for consideration as a physically unique identifier. However, the uniqueness of such an identifier was not numerically evaluated. Moreover, using a NAND flash drive for such a method of identification is complicated because modern NAND memory chips contain a special microcontroller to prevent the degradation of memory blocks and prevent using degraded memory blocks [28] . Finally, it should be noted that while NAND flash memory is used in storage devices such as USB-flash drives or SSD drives, which are widely employed in complex computer systems, it is rarely used in simple devices (e.g., most of IoT devices) due to technological reasons [28] .
Further development of PUF-based methods is related to NOR flash memory. In contrast with NAND, the life span of NOR flash memory is about 10 times shorter; thus it is degrading faster. Moreover, NOR flash memory widely is used in network devices including resource-constrained IoT devices for storing the device microprogram. In our previous work [11] , it was proposed to use a forcibly degraded segment of a NOR flash memory chip as a unique identifier of the whole network device. In this paper, we elaborate on the idea and provide hardware testing.
III. METHOD DESCRIPTION A. THE DEGRADATION OF FLASH MEMORY
The NOR-flash memory is a two-dimensional array of lowlevel memory cells, located on the matrix of the conductor [29] , [30] . Each of these low-level cells stores from one to four bits of information, depending on the type of the cell. To record or erase the information in the memory cell its charge must be changed [31] . The architecture of a NOR flash memory cell presented in Fig. 1 . During the recording process, specific cells change the initial state of a bit (usually it is ''1''), to the opposite (''0''). Each change in the state of charge of the cell causes the accumulation of irreversible changes in its structure, and at a particular moment, a cell may cease to change its state. Further, we name such cells as bad-cells and the process of the appearance of bad-cells as the degradation of a memory chip.
The bad-cells in the NOR-flash memory always retain the same state of charge regardless of the erasing/recording procedures that are carried-out [28] , [33] . Occasionally, separate bad-cells may change their charge during the recording process. However, during the subsequent erasing/recording, they again drop to their constant initial state.
B. MEMORY CHIP DESIGN
The NOR-flash memory chip has a hierarchic structure, as shown in Fig. 2 . The total volume of the chip can be determined by a formula N × M × Pg × V Pg , where N is the amount of the memory blocks, M is the amount of memory sectors in one block, and P is the amount of memory pages with the volume V Pg (Bytes) in one sector [30] .
A sector is the minimal erasable part of a NOR-flash memory. Consequently, to change at least one bit of information in the chip, the following algorithm must be utilized [12] , [28] , [33] :
• Read the whole memory sector;
• Change the necessary information;
• Erase the whole read sector;
• Record the changed information in the erased memory sector (page-by-page).
C. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE
An image (S) of a degraded memory sector (the map of badcells in the sector) can be used to establish a procedure of chip identification. Since flash memory chips are used in most modern ICT devices, one memory sector in the chip can be allocated for the identification purpose (for example, the first or last sector) and then a chip, and consequently, a device can be identified [11] . It should contain a certain number of bad-cells before being installed into the device to enable using the chip as an identifier. These bad-cells can be created by overwriting the memory sector until the appearance of stable bad-cells (forcible degradation). Since the device with the degraded chip inside is manufactured, the image (S) must be recorded by the manufacturer into the database of the released devices. Throughout the lifetime of the devices, the sector allocated for identification should be accessible for remote reading by third-party (e.g., communication services provider, authorities). Afterward, the pattern of bad-cells can be checked in the database (for instance, it can be a corporate, local, national, or international register of the devices). If the bad-cell pattern is not in the database, the device will be denied of service.
IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT TESTING AND DUPLICATION EVALUATION OF IDENTIFIERS A. HARDWARE TESTING OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
For testing of the proposed method, a hardware experiment was performed. During the experiment, a forced degradation of NOR-flash memory chips was executed. All chips in the experiment were connected to a custom test bed. A Raspberry Pi 3 (Raspbian Linux OS) was selected for this trial. The chips were connected to the SPI interface of the Raspberry according to the standard scheme shown in Fig. 3 . To enable the testing, a custom library of functions (pi-spiflash) was developed and is currently available for public. This library is currently uploaded on the Github 2 for free use.
The testing was performed using 2 Mbit chips W25X16VSIG, W25X16AVSIG, and W25Q16VSIG with a standard command system. There were a total of 120 chips in the experiment. The chips had the similar memory structure: N = 32 blocks; M = 16 sectors in a block (512 sectors per chip); K = 16 pages in a sector, (8192 pages per a chip). The volume of each page is 256 bytes. The first memory sector (4096 bytes with the address 000000h) of each chip was forcibly degraded through multiple rewriting.
During the testing, each chip was subjected to a forced degradation (350,000 write cycles for each chip). The degradation affected only the first memory sector. As a result of forced degradation, a set of images (bad-cell maps) of the first memory sector, was obtained. The number of bad-cells for most chips tested (111 pieces) ranged from 30 to 100.
The next phase was the identification of every chip using the image of the first sector. After the images of the first sector 2 https://github.com/vlad-ss/pi-spiflash were read, positions of the bad-cells were compared among all the chips being tested. To illustrate it, Table 1 shows the matrix of bad-cell matches for 12 randomly picked chips.
Rows of Table 1 correspond with numbers C of chips. Columns correspond with the identifiers S(C) of these chips. The intersection of rows and columns shows how many badcells were matched. To find the matches, we erased the first sector of each of 12 selected chips and then compared them with each identifier. For example, identifier S(3) refers to chip no.3 (36 bad-cells matched), but also two bad-cells of S(3) are matched with chip no.4 and one bad-cell matched with chip no.7. The obtained results show that we can correctly identify every chip using majority decision.
Also we get mutual correlation (including autocorrelation) of defined identifiers S(C). The graphs of the normalized value of mutual correlation of identifiers S(1)-S(12) are plotted (Fig. 4) . On the ordinate axis, the correlation value is indicated, where one corresponds to the complete coincidence of the bad-cell positions. The abscissa axis indicates the numbers C = {1, 2, . . . , 12} of identifiers (chips) to be compared.
From Fig. 4 it can be seen that the rate of duplication in the positions of bad-cells between different identifiers within the set of chips is negligible. Consequently, the experiment proved that the proposed method could be used for identification of the devices.
B. THE REPEATABILITY OF THE IDENTIFIERS
The repeatability of the identifiers depends on the several parameters: (i) size of the memory area allocated for identification (the larger it is, the less repeatability), (ii) number of devices to be identified, (iii) the share of bad-cells. If the number of bad-cells m in sector used for identification is in a range from m 1 to m 2 and degradation (bad-cells) occurs equiprobable amongst cells, then the total number of unique combinations of the bad-cells can be estimated using where m is amount bad-cells, T is the total amount of cells in a sector of chip allocated for identification, and C is the number of unique combinations of the bad-cells. To determine the probability of the appearance of two equal identifiers (δ) among devices (d), the solution of ''birthday paradox'' [34] can be utilized
where d is a total number of devices to be identified. The target bad-cells shared in a sector, which should be reached during degradation process, can be determined by a simplified example: let us assume a total number of cells in a sector (T ) is 100. By changing the number of bad-cells in the sector from 1 to 99, the number of unique combinations of bad-cells (C m 100 ) was estimated and presented on a graph (Fig. 5 ). The graph clearly shows that the highest value of unique combination can be reached if the share of bad-cells is 50% of the total cells in the sector.
Further, the probability of the appearance of two equal identifiers (δ) has to be estimated. The calculation of (δ) using equation 2 required high computational performance, even FIGURE 6. The probability of appearance at least two equal identifiers for T = 100.
for the simplified example. As an alternative, equation 2 can be approximated by the expansion of an exponential function in a Taylor series
For the calculation of (3), K = 10 29 was taken, it corresponded to m = 50. The calculation made for variable d is presented on a graph (Fig. 6) . Here, the probability of the appearance two equal identifiers is extremely low even if the total number of devices to be identified is one trillion (d = 10 12 ).
It is must be considered that the continuous procedure of erase-and-read of the allocated sector during the flash memory chip lifetime can lead to the appearance of new bad-cells. As it follows from the experiment described in Section IV.A the mean number of the erase cycles required for appearance a new bad-cell is about 3940. This number of cycles corresponds to more than ten years of device use with daily identification. However, if the bad-cell appeared during the lifetime of a device and there is another device with an ID (bad-cell distribution) differing by one bad-cell, the identification process can be failed for these devices. The possibility of such an event is following from (3), and can be estimated using formula (4)
For general case (n of new bad-cells appeared), the (4) can be expressed in the following form:
In figure Fig. 7 we provide numerical results for the (5) within the considered simplified scenario (T = 100).
As it can be seen from the Fig. 7 , the probability of appearance at least two equal identifiers slight even if five new badcells appeared during the lifetime of the device. Moreover, this calculation was made for the simplified scenario (T = 100), whereas the real number of cells in a sector is T = 32768. Consequently, in a real case, the probability of the appearance of at least two equal identifiers will be statistically infinitesimal. 
V. CONSIDERATION OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES A. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION OF TWO NETWORK DEVICES
In a case of M2M communication, devices have to identify each other. The scheme of mutual identification for two ICT devices with the use of external trusted identifiers' database is shown in Fig. 8 .
The procedure of identification for this use case is executed in four steps: 1) Network devices A and B get each other's full identifiers S(A) and S(B) correspondingly; 2) Each network device checks the received full identifier in the trusted database (C); 3) After the confirmation from the C, network devices start the data exchange process; 4) Regular confirmation utilizes the short identifiers P(A) and P(B). Therefore, a differentiated approach can be applied: for (i) initial identification devices use full identifiers S, for (ii) dynamic or confirmatory identification with the use of short identifiers P.
B. THE DYNAMIC IDENTIFICATION USING A CROSS-CORRELATION FUNCTION
The use of short identifiers for dynamic identification has its drawbacks, among which there is the necessity to transfer 
The calculated identifier D i (A) is transferred to the device B, which calculates the corresponding dynamic identifier D Bi (A), using its identifier S i (B) and the image S Bi (A)
If the identifier D i (A), received from A and the identifier D Bi (A) calculated by B are equal, then identification of the device A by the device B is completed successfully.
The sectors S i , used for calculating the dynamic identifier D i , can be chosen in different ways. The first option is the use of the rectangular sector as it is shown in Fig. 9 .
The second way involves the use of cross sectors. In this case, the address i points to a memory cell in the S. The cell i is a crossing point of a line and a column, this line and column form a sector S i . The example of such sectors is shown in Fig. 10 . If the devices A and B are synchronized with each other, it is not required to transfer the address i with every message. The i can be established at the initial identification and each data package, which was successfully received, will change the address i by one step. This sequential address changing can be performed by shifting registers.
It is worth noting that the dynamic identification is not limited to using CCF. The cross-correlation function was chosen to demonstrate a simple and universal way to compare identifiers with their casts. The method considered in this subsection is convenient to use for debugging the identification protocol, and for its initial implementation. In future works, other methods can be considered and compared, in order to define the most efficient one.
C. OPTIONS OF THE DYNAMIC IDENTIFICATION
Dynamic identification may have two options. The first option is a ''confirmatory'' dynamic identification (Fig. 11) . In this case, every network device sends its dynamic identifier, informing the device-interlocutor that important data was received correctly.
The second option is the identification by request. In this case, the network device requests the identifier from its interlocutor (Fig. 12) . The rate of requests depends on the importance of data. It may be sent in a case if there is uncertainty in the validity of the interlocutor, for example, when incorrect data packets appear. 
D. MITIGATING COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEADS
In this subsection, we consider the computational overhead introduced by the proposed identification method. To compare the performance of different identification methods, we measure the mean time required for the identification of an ICT device using each of the methods.
Performance of the proposed method depends on the number of records in a database (number of registered devices) and the size of the identifiers. If the number of records in the database is large and the size of an identifier (the volume of the memory chip allocated for identification) is significant, the computational complexity of a device verification procedure may become considerably high. To reduce the computational complexity, the initial search in a database can be performed using a conventional identifier (e.g., MAC address, IMEI) as a key. After the record is found, the device identity can be verified by a comparison of the bad cell pattern.
For a numerical evaluation of the time required to search for an identifier in a database, we performed an express test using a system of computer algebra GNU/Octave. The test allows us to define the relative difference between conventional (IMEI) and proposed identification methods. During the test we considered four options: (i) search of full identifier S; (ii) search of S using short pointer P (first 256 bytes of S) with subsequent verification of S; (iii) search of IMEI; (iv) search of S using IMEI as a pointer with subsequent verification of S. For the experiment, we used a simplified database containing 10,000 records. For each option, we executed 1,000 search attempts. The meantime t s required for searching for the identifiers during the test is shown in Table 2 . Table 2 demonstrates that time required for the identification of an ICT device using unique degradation of NOR flash is approximately 53 percent higher than using IMEI. However, in cases of using a pointer, the time difference with the conventional method is only 10-15 percent.
It should be noted that the performed test indicates the relative difference in identification time for considered methods. Absolute values of identification time can be reduced considerably if specialized computational systems and acceleration methods are utilized, while the relative difference between the times required by each method remains the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
As it was demonstrated in this paper, the degraded flash memory sector can be used as a unique identifier of a device. One memory sector has an extremely high number of possible bad-cell combinations. Moreover, the combination of badcells is difficult to tamper. Due to these two facts, the reliable identification for quadrillions of devices can be provided by only one memory sector. This number of devices is far beyond the existing demand (existing number of ICT devices).
Considering security issues of the method it should be noted each identification system that is based on transmitting identifiers through a public network is vulnerable to a substitution attack. The traditional solution is to use cryptography protected channels.
For future development of the method, many implementation challenges should be addressed. Firstly, the proposed approach can be tremendously improved by specifically designing chips optimized for use as identifiers. These chips should contain low volume sectors and include an option for fast degradation. The optimized chips will allow a reduction in the time and cost for the degradation process and simplify the identifiers (identifiers are currently too redundant). Secondly, the network protocol has to be developed for remote identification of the ICT devices using degraded flash memory. This protocol should be integrated into the OSI model and serve as a tool for blocking counterfeit or stolen devices. Thirdly, the database architecture for both storing and managing the identifiers must be developed. This architecture should be highly reliable and protected from malicious changes.
Finally, further development of this theory is required. Particularly, theoretical foundations of the method should consider the natural appearance of bad-cells in a memory during the lifespan of a device. Due to this process, these new bad-cells may change the identifier, causing a device to be blocked even if it is not counterfeit or stolen.
